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Abstract
Countries have a self-image of their role in global climate governance. If that 
image does not correspond to the country’s actual level of climate power, 
commitment and leadership, it becomes a myth. In this article, we define climate 
self-images/myths and analyze comprehensively the Brazilian case between 
1989 and 2019. For most of this period, Brazil’s self-image was a myth.
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Introduction
During the second half of the 2000s, the Brazilian government consolidated an official narrative of the 
country as a major reformist power in the governance of climate 
change. This self-image had three central dimensions: Brazil 
as a major agent in the global carbon cycle; a key player in the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) negotiations, and a developing country that far 
exceeded its obligations to contribute to stabilizing global 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, thus becoming a role model 
in terms of mitigation actions. This image had emerged in 1992 
at the Rio Conference, and in 1996-97 during the negotiations 
of the Kyoto Protocol (KP). 
By the end of the 2000’s, President Lula da Silva was telling 
the “American and European friends” that “in Brazil we talk less 
and do more” (Munari 2009), when announcing the country’s 
mitigation commitment for the UNFCCC’s Copenhagen COP. 
In 2015, President Dilma Rousseff ’s envoy to the COP in Paris 
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declared that Brazil already was a low-carbon economy,– a highly debatable statement that was 
incorporated into the Brazilian Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) (Brazil, 
Ministério do Meio Ambiente 2015). Although this climate self-image was built on some real 
improvements – such as the success of deforestation control in the Amazon between 2005 
and 2012 and some developments in climate policy in the late 2000s – it ignored significant 
contradicting facts, such as the extremely irrational path of Land Use, Land Use Change and 
Forestry (LULUCF) emissions between 1990 and 2004; the Amazon deforestation resurge 
since 2012; Brazil’s conservative position in the UNFCCC negotiations; the increase in the 
share of fossil fuels in the energy matrix, and the path of domestic economic policy, which in 
every possible way conflicted with a low-carbon transition. Consequently, the self-image was 
nothing more than a myth. 
In this article, we describe and analyze the mythical self-image that Brazil has created in 
three decades of the climate regime, with special focus on the period between 2006 and 2018, 
when Brazil was able to control deforestation and changed the path of climate commitment, 
further fueling the major reformist power myth. In order to do that, we first define what climate 
self-images and myths are. 
The article is structured according to the following parts: in the first section, we conceptualize 
climate self-images and myths. In the second, we present the Brazilian climate myth, for which 
we identify three periods: Brazil as a major moderate climate power and leader of the developing 
world (1989-2005); Brazil as a major reformist power and global leader (2006-2018), and; the 
end of the climate myth under the Presidency of Jair Bolsonaro, beginning in 2019. We focus 
on the second period, in which the Brazilian myth was stronger and widespread. In the third 
section, we problematize the Brazilian self-image as a major reformist power and global leader 
during the second period, arguing that it was nothing but a myth. The main evidence against 
this distorted self-image relies on Brazilian GHG emissions, which have been much higher than 
the world per capita average in the whole period, dominated by emissions from deforestation 
in the Amazon – which is an aberration for a middle-income democracy – and, a fossilization 
of the energy and electricity matrix – an unseen development for an emergent economy. The 
climate policy instruments developed since the late 2000s – including the 2010 national climate 
law – have not been able to change this situation. Moreover, the official narrative that Brazil has 
shown high levels of climate commitment because it sharply reduced its emissions between 2005 
and 2012 ignores the fact that emissions were extremely high and extremely irrational in the 
previous decade. Finally, we conclude. 
Our assessment of both the climate self-images, and the analysis of these, is based on public 
documents and public speeches by the Brazilian authorities. Our focus is on climate change 
mitigation – which is an imminently cooperative endeavor if it is to be successful – and not on 
adaptation – which is mainly still a local concern.
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Climate self-images and myths. Conceptualization
Countries have a self-image of their level of agency (climate power) and achievements 
(climate commitment) in global climate governance, which is essential to their national identity 
and foreign policy discourse. This self-image is constructed mainly by governments, with varying 
degrees of support in their societies. In democratic societies, meaningful participation of NGOs 
and business is necessary to consolidate and sustain climate images. Being a self-image, it is always 
more forgiving than an external evaluation. 
A climate myth is a distorted self-image of the country’s role in global climate governance, 
where the gap between the discourse and the actual power and commitment is strong. The bigger 
the gap, the larger the myth. Both climate self-images and myths have three main components: the 
level of agency of the country to influence the outcome of climate cooperation – climate power, 
– the level of benignity of its efforts to stabilize the climate system – climate commitment – and, 
the level of agency in climate negotiations – climate leadership (Viola and Franchini 2018). More 
specifically, the usual components of the climate self-image/myth are as follows:
• Relevance in terms of GHG emissions: generally indicated by the country’s share of global 
emissions and/or its level of emissions per capita. Typically, countries with a low share of global 
emissions and low per capita emissions tend to emphasize this in order to sidestep international 
pressures for mitigation measures. Colombia is a case for the former and India for the latter.
• Climate vulnerability: countries tend to overemphasize the negative effects of climate change 
on their territory and/or economy in order to dilute pressures for mitigation or to appear more 
climate–committed. The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) is a typical case. 
• Contribution to climate mitigation: in the areas of finance, low carbon technology development 
and transfer, national policies and, international negotiations. Countries tend to exaggerate and 
emphasize those actions that are convergent with mitigation and ignore those that are not, such as 
China highlighting the advance of renewable energy without recognizing the high proportion of coal 
in its electricity matrix and the continuation of construction of thermo-power plants (Sengupta 2018). 
• Relationship between mitigation and international obligations: this is a central point, as countries 
tend to argue that they are contributing to climate stabilization more than they should; that is, 
that they are exceeding the demands of the CBDR (Common But Differentiated Responsibilities) 
principle. This is particularly true for non-Annex 1 countries such as China, Brazil, Mexico or India.
• Relationship with other relevant actors: climate self-images are relative to other countries and even 
to the wider international community. The narrative of the G-77+China countries is intrinsically 
linked to the discourse of the inaction of its developed parties in the regime. The Chinese self-image 
feeds on the reluctance of the US to engage in climate cooperation under President Trump.
• Relevance within climate negotiations: many countries tend to exaggerate their level of impact 
on the negotiating process in the climate regime, particularly during the most relevant periods 
(negotiation of the Climate Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, the Copenhagen Accord, the 
Paris Agreement), presenting themselves as “leaders.” 
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Climate self-image or climate myth?
To assess the difference between a country’s self-image and myth – that is, to identify when 
an image has become a myth – it is necessary to analyze the gap between the discourse and the 
actual levels of climate power, climate commitment, and climate leadership in each case. To 
analyze the first dimension, we use the concept of climate power (Viola et al. 2012), in which 
the participation of countries in global emissions and their level of low carbon capital are the 
key indicators. Consequently, only a few countries play a central role in affecting the global 
climate social outcome. We refer to these nations as ‘the great climate powers’: The United 
States, the EU, and China. An encompassing and efficient cooperation scheme is unlikely to 
succeed without their participation (Viola and Franchini 2018). Other relevant countries, – albeit 
not central actors but nonetheless still important, – are called middle powers, such as Brazil, 
Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, South Korea, Canada, and Japan. Finally, around 40 countries are 
small powers with very limited capacity to alter the path of climate governance whereas the rest 
is practically irrelevant in this regard. 
Climate power implies the potential to become translated into climate leadership, that is, the 
capacity of a country to influence the outcome of international climate negotiations, particularly 
within the UNFCCC. Leadership can be positive/reformist – if it fosters cooperation and global 
mitigation – or negative/conservative – if it provides obstacles to this. The impact can be measured 
in how the premises defended by one country are, or are not, acknowledged by the regime. To 
assess the gap between the self-image and the actual level of climate commitment, we use the 
Climate Commitment Approach (CCA) (Viola and Franchini 2018), which analyses both the 
trajectory of GHG emissions and the density of policy responses to climate change, to evaluate 
whether a society is being a driver for mitigation (reformist) or acceleration of the climate crisis 
(conservative). The lower the level of per capita emissions and carbon intensity of GDP, and the 
stronger the climate policy framework (legal and bureaucratic climate infrastructure, mandatory 
mitigation targets, and relevant international commitments), the higher the level of climate 
commitment. Finally, it is important to acknowledge that myths vary over time, depending 
on several factors, particularly the climate standing of governments and climate momentums 
within the international system. The positive impact of the Paris Process on Latin-American 
climate commitment (Franchini 2019) and the negative impact of Donald Trump’s election 
are examples of this.
The Brazilian climate myth (1989 - 2019)
The Brazilian climate self-image implies, firstly, that the country is a central player in 
climate governance, mainly for two reasons: its natural assets and its political assets. The first 
category encompasses, particularly, the centrality of the Amazon Forest in the global carbon 
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cycle and the large share of global freshwater and agricultural lands. Political assets comprise, 
primarily, the high share of renewable sources in the country’s energy matrix (hydroelectricity 
and ethanol), the success in reducing emissions from Amazon deforestation since the mid-2000s 
and, the development of climate policies since late 2000s, particularly the 2010 national climate 
law (Brazil, Ministério do Meio Ambiente 2015; Viola and Franchini 2018). Accordingly, Brazil 
presents itself as a reformist power, and a big emergent economy that has been doing more than 
its fair share in terms of climate mitigation (Brazil, Ministério do Meio Ambiente 2015; Brazil, 
Ministério das Relações Exteriores 2016a) – this is the second dimension of Brazilian self-image. 
Finally, Brazil has portrayed itself as a champion of the interests of the developing world within 
international climate negotiations, and, at the same time, as a bridge between the developing 
and the developed world. In this sense, Brazil presents itself as a climate leader; a central piece 
in international negotiations. A radical interpretation of the CBDR principle – in line with the 
G-77+China – has always been a central part of this self-image of leadership. In the last three 
decades, the Brazilian myth has varied in terms of substance, intensity (the distance to reality), 
and its prominence within the foreign policy agenda of the government, but always maintained 
the premise of the country’s relevance and commitment in climate governance, with the recent 
exception of the Bolsonaro administration, as we shall see. 
In this article, we focus on the most intense and developed version of this myth, which grew as 
Brazil was able to control deforestation in the Amazon since 2005. However, the roots of this narrative 
can be traced back to the early 1990s, when Brazil hosted the Rio 92 Summit. Accordingly, we have 
identified three periods of the Brazilian climate self-image/myth: a period of Brazil presenting itself as 
a major moderate climate power and leader of the developing world (1989 - 2005); a period of Brazil 
as a major reformist climate power and global leader (2006-2018), and; a period of Brazil renouncing 
the climate myth under the Bolsonaro administration (2019). Although the first two self-images were 
distorted, the intensity of the climate myth in the second period was considerably higher.
Figure 1. Highlights in Brazilian Climate Myth
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Restrained myth: major moderate power and G-77 champion in climate 
negotiations (1989 - 2005)
Brazil entered the international politics of climate change as a villain, on account of the huge 
rate of deforestation and burnings in the Amazon rainforest in the late 1980s (Brooke 1990). 
Accordingly, the international community and public opinion perceived Brazil as both a major 
climate power and as an extremely conservative one (Viola and Franchini 2018). Although only 
the second part was accurate – since the international community enormously exaggerated the 
Brazilian share of global emissions – Brazil’s climate self-image was heavily influenced by this 
perception. Thus, the Brazilian climate myth was born as a reaction to the international myth of 
the country being a “burner” of the world. Moreover, as Brazil’s condemnation was accompanied by 
some demands for international protection of the Amazon – such as those of Al Gore and François 
Mitterrand (Hochstetler and Keck 2007) – climate change was assimilated to the existing Amazon 
Paranoia (Viola and Franchini 2018); that is, the exaggerated notion among Brazil’s political and 
security elites that the region was coveted by the North because of its immense wealth. As the 
region constitutes half of Brazil’s territory, with little state presence, the idea of a sovereign threat 
easily took root. Somehow, the Brazilian government was pushed to create a defensive narrative by 
the discourse and actions of these actors within the international community. Brazil could have 
ignored those critics or invested in sustainable actions, but it chose to exaggerate its achievements 
instead of actually making them. 
The Brazilian myth has, nonetheless, a bright side if compared to other emergent 
economies: it was developed in the 1990s, earlier than those of Mexico and China, and was 
influenced by some positive features of Brazil as an open society after the democratization 
in the mid-1980s, namely; a strong civil society; grass root democracy; the process of the 
1988 constitutional reform; a strong environmental movement; and a productive system 
relatively open to the world in terms of investment. Consequently, in the first decade and 
half of the climate regime, Brazil would, simultaneously, embrace the major climate power 
perception as part of its self-image and counter the climate villain narrative. The country thus 
deployed a defensive position regarding mitigation obligations from the developing world and 
forest protection during the Kyoto negotiations; all measures rooted in the aforementioned 
nationalistic/sovereign concerns (Viola 2002).
The Rio 92 Summit was the first major response by the Brazilian government to change the 
country’s international image and present itself as a more committed power. The possibility of 
hosting the Summit – and more broadly, the convenience of trying to counter Brazil’s negative 
international image – divided positions inside President Sarney’s administration (1985-90). Yet, 
ultimately the special adviser Ruben Ricupero’s position of presenting a reliable Brazil prevailed 
over the more nationalistic positions, which were heavily influenced by the Amazon Paranoia. 
The strategy was decidedly embraced by President Collor de Mello (1990-1992), following his 
approximation to the Western Democracies.
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In January 1991, President Collor stated:
My government, in defending the environment, has tried to be consistent and 
adopt exemplary positions, to the point that we have managed to move from being 
criminals in the process of international denunciations against the country to being 
at the forefront of global ecological initiatives (Brazil, Ministério de Relações 
Exteriores 1991).
The Rio 92 had a profound impact within Brazil, increasing the relevance of environmental 
issues in the domestic realm and portraying a more positive image of the country internationally. 
Accordingly, it also contributed to feed the myth. In September 1992, Minister Celso Lafer, 
addressing the United Nations General Assembly, stated that the Rio 92 was the greatest diplomatic 
event since the end of World War II and, regarding Brazil’s role:
The Brazilian delegation played fully the mediation role that made the success 
of the conference possible. Perhaps never before has a developing country played 
such an important role in a global international negotiation so easily (Correa 
2007, 548).
During Cardoso’s Presidency (1995-2002), environmental/climate issues somehow faded 
from the governmental priorities, with the exception of the period 2001-2002, as we shall see. 
However, within the UNFCCC negotiations, the Brazilian diplomacy continued to reproduce the 
self-image of the country as a major moderate power with high impact over climate negotiations 
and an advocate of the interests of the developing world. 
At the start of negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol (1996), Brazil proposed the Clean 
Development Fund to finance less carbon-intensive development in non-Annex I countries. 
Almost immediately the United States proposed to transform it into the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM), and Brazil agreed. The proposal easily reached consensus and was 
incorporated into the Kyoto Protocol (Viola 2002). However, since 1997, the Brazilian 
government has presented the CDM as an exclusively Brazilian proposal as a way of sustaining 
the climate myth. 
Also in 1997, Brazil proposed an extremely radical interpretation of the CBDR principle, 
labeled “The Brazilian Proposal,” to account for the historical responsibilities of countries 
in causing climate change. The Proposal stated that GHG emissions should be counted not 
since 1990, as defined in the UNFCCC, but since 1850 (Viola and Franchini 2018). To avoid 
counting Brazil’s disastrous deforestation performance, the emissions to be accounted for would 
be from energy, industry and transport only, not LULUCF. With this interpretation of CBDR, 
Brazil became the champion of most developing countries, as they could continue to increase 
emissions for many decades until the historically accumulated emissions reached the level of 
developed countries. Accordingly, the Brazilian proposal was contradictory to any rationality 
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in terms of avoiding dangerous climate change. For example, the gigantic increase in emissions 
from China and India in the last 15 years was protected and justified by the wording of the 
Brazilian proposal. Thus, India’s radical approach to “climate neocolonialism” was inspired 
by the Brazilian proposal, as was China’s position that its emissions would only peak around 
2050 (Viola 2002). In this case, Brazil had indeed assumed a position of leadership within 
the UNFCCC, but a negative one, being the most radical voice of the alleged global clash 
between a center of developed countries responsible for the climate problem and a developing 
periphery that was forced to pay for it, even though it had not contributed significantly to 
its existence. 
After a period of relative calm, the Brazilian leadership narrative re-emerged during the final 
negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, when the Cardoso administration was very active in 
a partnership with the EU and Japan to reach a final agreement after President Bush’s decision 
to withdraw from the KP. In several speeches, FHC criticized the lack of commitment of the US 
government, stating that the Bush administration’s decision “was a step backwards” and that Brazil 
should have to pursue a leadership role, making it “necessary to talk to a lot of people, including 
China and India, which are developing countries like us” (França 2001)
Unrestrained myth: major power, mitigation role model and, global leader in 
climate negotiations (2006 - 2018)
After a few years (2003 - 2005) of decline of the climate agenda, both internationally and in 
Brazil, the second stage in the evolution of the Brazilian self-image gradually took form around 
2006 - 2007, when the positive results of deforestation control policies in the Amazon became 
evident. As we have shown in previous works (Viola and Franchini 2014; 2018), the process of 
sustained reduction of deforestation rates – from 24,000 km2 in 2004 to 4,500 km2 in 2012 – was 
the most relevant factor that allowed Brazil to increase its level of climate commitment in the 
period; thus, overcoming what we have called the “Amazonian Impotence” (Viola and Franchini 
2018). Accordingly, all those years of national shame and defensive positions regarding the Amazon 
rapidly became a matter of national pride. 
In terms of the self-image, the translation of this change was almost immediate: in the 2006 
UNFCCC COP in Nairobi, the Minister of the Environment, Marina Silva, proposed a financial 
mechanism to stimulate deforestation control policies in developing countries and even offered 
Brazilian technology and knowhow to help poor countries (Mendes and Mattos 2006). President 
Lula defended the proposal – which broke a tradition to avoid forest management in the climate 
regime – saying: 
“Brazil has a clean energy matrix” and that the 30% reduction in the pace of 
deforestation in the Amazon recorded in the last two years “accredits the country 
to present its proposal at COP-12” (Thuswhol 2006).
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In the 2008 Poznan COP, Minister Minc presented the international community with the 
new National Plan on Climate Change, – the first to set mitigation targets for Brazil. Minc stated 
in an interview:
Brazil’s National Climate Change Plan foresees 70% reduction in deforestation by 
2018, which is equivalent to 4.8 billion tons of CO2. This is more than all the 
effort made by developed countries in Kyoto. In addition, there is Ethanol, which 
will not occupy 1 hectare of the Amazon and Pantanal and will not take up food 
space (Ximenes 2008).
But the climax of the unrestrained Brazilian myth came in late 2009, in the preface of the 
Copenhagen COP 15, when President Lula announced that Brazil would commit to a voluntary 
mitigation target for 2020, “to show our American and European friends that in Brazil we 
not only talk, but do” (Munari 2009). Accordingly, Brazil was now presenting itself not only 
as a major power leading the developing countries, but as a global role model for mitigation 
governance. In this spirit, the Brazilian President declared that his country was ready to transfer 
resources for the Green Climate Fund. Moreover, almost one month before the Copenhagen 
Summit, President Lula also criticized Brazil’s big emerging partners (particularly China and 
India) and the U.S. for not adopting ambitious emissions reduction pledges, and hereupon 
signed a reformist declaration with President Sarkozy of France. During the joint conference 
with the French President, Lula declared:
I think this document signed by President Sarkozy and myself, it is more than a 
letter of principle. I think it becomes our climate bible. That is, and we, obviously, 
who go to Copenhagen and go to the subsequent meetings we hold with the other 
countries, to guide them towards a paradigm close to this here or the same here 
(Itamaraty 2009).
According to Lula’s image of the country, Brazil was guiding the world by example by setting 
ambitious mitigation goals. In another part of the same statement, he added: “So we’re convinced 
that if the Brazilians take this as a symbol, we’ll surprise the world by doing it faster and maybe 
even more” (Itamaraty 2009). Ultimately, this peak of extravagance of the Brazilian climate myth 
was short-lived, since Brazil not only backed away from criticizing, but also aligned itself with 
the conservative positions of the BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) countries in 
COP 15, only a few weeks after Lula’s meeting with Sarkozy. The contribution to the GCF never 
materialized (Green Climate Fund Data)1. 
The Brazilian position in Copenhagen, although less conservative than China and India’s 
regarding the voluntary commitments, did not involve a change in the radical interpretation 
of CBDR: Brazil accepted to commit to a mitigation target not because it was an international 
1 https://www.greenclimate.fund/how-we-work/resource-mobilization
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obligation, but because Brazil wanted to, as it was a reformist climate power (Viola and Franchini 
2018; Hochstetler and Milkoreit 2015). In spite of these inconsistencies, the climate myth continued 
strong during 2010, the last year of Lula’s Presidency, and was further supported by the sanctioning 
of the national climate law in early 2010 and, the electoral performance of Marina Silva in the 
2010 presidential election, in which she got around 19% of the national vote, running on a 
platform heavily defined by climate/environmental issues. 
During Dilma Rousseff ’s first tenure (2011 - 2014), the myth went into a period of low 
visibility, albeit maintaining the core narrative of Lula’s tenure. Accordingly, climate change 
vanished from the center of the governmental agenda, following the lead of a new President 
that did not consider it a relevant issue (Viola and Franchini 2018). Not even the hosting of the 
Rio+20 changed that reality, as the Rio 92 had done two decades before. On the contrary, the 
previous successes of Brazil in mitigation were downplayed during the 2012 Summit, in which the 
government chose to highlight its progress on economic and social issues (Brazil 2011; Viola and 
Franchini 2012). In the UNFCCC, Brazil continued to present itself as a key committed player, 
however resuming the more conservative G-77 style discourse that it had abandoned during the 
second tenure of Lula da Silva. The return of the Brazilian Proposal in the Warsaw COP in 2013 
(Viola and Franchini 2014) and, the concentric circles submission in the Lima COP (Brazil 2014) 
the following year, can be seen in this light. 
In 2015, however, the Brazilian climate self-image of a reformist major power came into 
full force again, as Rousseff was struggling to find positive agendas in the midst of the crisis that 
eventually would result in her impeachment in August 2016. In July 2015, President Rousseff met 
with President Obama in the U.S., and for the first time since 2009, the Brazilian government 
announced new mitigation measures, aiming at the COP 21 in Paris. At the meeting, Dilma 
resorted to the Brazilian climate myth, which was supported by President Obama, who stated 
that Brazil was a world leader in global affairs (Silva 2015). To make things even, Dilma also 
acknowledged the American myth of climate leadership. Both images of climate power, leadership, 
and mitigation success can be seen in the joint statement:
The Presidents highlighted the fact that, since 2005, Brazil and the United States have 
reduced greenhouse gas emissions in absolute terms more than any other countries in 
the world. […] In the run-up to the UN Climate Conference in Paris, both countries 
are respectively putting forward strong post-2020 contributions consistent with their 
determination to show global leadership (The White House 2015).
At the 2015 Paris COP, Brazil reached another extreme of climate mythology, as Minister 
Teixeira presented the country as a low carbon economy, grounded on the share of renewables in 
the energy matrix and the success in deforestation control (Brazil, Ministério do Meio Ambiente 
2015). Moreover, Brazil, the low carbon economy, was willing to make an additional effort in 
Paris, presenting a very ambitious contribution according to the official narrative:
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[…] it is evident that Brazil’s iNDC, while consistent with its national circumstances 
and capabilities, is far more ambitious than what would correspond to Brazil’s 
marginal relative responsibility for the global average temperature increase (Brazil, 
Ministério do Meio Ambiente 2015, 6).
This climate self-image at the end of Rousseff ’s administration underwent a subtle conservative 
twist compared to President Lula, for whom Brazil was ready to assume a key reformist role 
because of the advances in mitigation, whereas for Dilma, those advances were a line of defense 
against any further international pressure for more commitment. For Dilma, Brazil had already 
done plenty (Franchini 2016). 
During Michel Temer’s administration, the climate myth reached another stage of low profile, 
but still with some extravagances. In September 2016, in a speech celebrating the ratification of 
the Paris Agreement by the Brazilian authorities, Foreign Minister José Serra stated:
Brazil has an undeniable leadership role in climate change issues. We have actively 
contributed at all stages of the negotiation - since Rio 92 - and we are now one of 
the first major economies to ratify it. We have shown creativity and our ability to 
build bridges between countries at different levels of development (Brazil, Ministério 
das Relações Exteriores 2016b).
The myth was also present with regards to energy issues, particularly the Biofuture Platform, 
as stated by Minister Aloysio Nunes in October 2017:
The Platform will also affirm Brazil’s vanguard position in clean energy, with 
an effective contribution of the country to the construction of a social and 
environmentally sustainable global economy […] (Nunes 2017).
The end of the myth: climate change under Jair Bolsonaro (2019 - ?)
The election of Jair Bolsonaro in October 2018 has been a major change in Brazilian politics, 
crystallizing a process of profound transformations that started around June 2013 and was accelerated 
by the economic, political and moral bankruptcy of the Workers Party’s rule. Polarization across 
Brazilian society and political actors, internal power struggles within the Bolsonaro government, a 
chaotic federal administration with a low-profile President and a major uncertainty regarding the 
economic and social agenda of the new government mark the current political situation in Brazil.
In spite of this uncertainty, it is clear that climate change – or any other major environmental 
issue – is more peripheral to the Bolsonaro administration than any other in the last three decades. 
Moreover, the President has shown indifference and even open hostility towards the agenda, promising 
to withdraw Brazil from the Paris Agreement – even though he later rectified (Soares and Grandelle 
2018), – and actually withdrew the country’s candidature to host the 2019 COP. Also, bureaucracies 
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engaging specifically with climate change have disappeared from the Ministries of the Environment 
(MMA) and of Foreign Affairs (Girardi 2019). Thus, Brazil’s climate self-image has suffered major changes. 
The country’s image as a major climate power committed to the good of humanity has been replaced 
with a more nationalistic rhetoric according to which climate cooperation is a threat to sovereignty. As 
President Bolsonaro stated – wrongfully – in December 2018 regarding the Paris Agreement
Brazil is required to reforest an enormous area, the size of the state of Rio de Janeiro 
until 2030, if it doesn’t, the sanctions will come. In the first moment, political 
sanction, then economic, and in a third moment, there is the sanction of force 
(Soares and Grandelle 2018).
The hostility regarding the climate agenda is also shared by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Ernesto Araújo, who has stated that the “ideology” of climate change is a creation of leftist forces 
to increase the power of international organizations over national societies as well as a strategy 
to favor China’s economy (Di Cunto et al. 2018). It is still early to make a solid assessment of 
the future of the Brazilian climate self-image, but it is possible to state that during the Bolsonaro 
administration it will experience a similar process to what happens in the U.S. whenever a republican 
President is in office: no climate myth will be deployed since the authorities are hostile to the 
topic and not interested in adopting one. 
Before we enter into the assessment of the Brazilian climate self-image, it seems relevant to 
briefly make two important points. First, the trajectory of the Brazilian climate self-image has been 
heterogeneous over time, depending on the priorities of national administrations and the state of 
international cooperation. However, within those periods there have been different versions – or 
intensities – within the federal government. In general, the Ministries of Science and Technology 
and Foreign Affairs  deployed a more radical version of the myth, arguing that Brazil was a role 
model in climate affairs. On the contrary, the Ministry of the Environment – particularly during 
Marina Silva’s and Minc’s tenures – operated with a more moderate version, pressuring inside the 
administration for a more committed position regarding mitigation. This is a common feature of 
the Brazilian fragmented structure of government, which impacts not only climate/environmental 
issues, but all major areas of policy making (Mainwaring 1999). 
Second, Brazil’s self-image as a major reformist climate power took hold among many other 
actors beyond the Brazilian government, – both domestic and international, – which consequently 
became enablers of the climate myth. Domestically, a significant part of the climate/environment 
epistemic community – which is sound and internationally respected – supported the radical 
interpretation of CBDR during the Kyoto negotiations and, in the following decade, chose to 
highlight the marvels of deforestation control and emission reduction, downplaying the irrational 
path of emissions during the previous 15 years. Deforestation control also reinforced the climate 
myth amongst Brazilian NGOs, many of them with direct presence within the MMA during 
Marina Silva’s and Minc’s tenures. Moreover, a major part of the environmental movement – 
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similarly captured by the Amazon Impotence2 (Viola and Franchini 2018) –  saw the success in 
deforestation control as an epic achievement of the Brazilian society, when in reality, it was a fairly 
low-cost endeavor, both economically and politically. In any case, this overestimation reinforced 
the perception within the community that everything was possible in Brazil, even a key reformist 
role in global climate governance, if enough political will was deployed. In this calculation, basic 
considerations of economic and political constraints were ignored or seriously downplayed. 
Progressively, different actors in the international system began to reproduce the image of 
Brazil as a major reformist power. This was particularly clear from the UNFCCC negotiations, 
in which the delegates always are eager to show that sound international action is actually being 
undertaken. Accordingly, the E.U. and the U.S. used the Brazilian case to show how non-Annex 
1 countries were able to reduce emissions and be a part of the global mitigation effort. A 2013 
Brazil-E.U. joint statement declared:
They emphasized the significant and consistent reduction in the deforestation rate in the 
Amazon biome achieved by Brazil. They expressed their support to further EU-Brazil 
technical cooperation with the view to replicate and scale up these achievements in 
other biomes and other countries […] (Council of Europe Union 2013).
Moreover, since Brazil has been a hesitant power in international negotiations – with the 
potential to be a committed actor – the international community embraced the Brazilian myth in 
order to empower climate-friendly Brazilian actors to increase the country’s commitment. Although 
these positive expectations were scarcely delivered, some movements of Brazil from time to time, 
like convincing India to dampen its radical position upon Paris 2015, seem enough to project 
some hope. In an environment in which good news are scarce, having a mitigation champion 
among the big emerging economies surely seemed attractive. In the end, Brazil was a good case 
to believe in: it was a big democracy, with an expanding economy and reducing inequality, led 
by a figure and a Party – President Lula da Silva from the Workers Party – that was a symbol 
of personal and political overcoming. Since the mid-2000s, it was also protecting the global 
environment by preserving the Amazon Rainforest. Never mind the holes in that image, which 
is the topic of the next section.
Assessing the Brazilian climate myth
The self-image that Brazil has projected in climate governance in the last three decades 
has been a myth, since the official discourse hardly has fit the actual level of climate power 
and commitment of the country. The image of the leadership role in UNFCCC negotiations 
is more realistic at some points in history, as we shall show. On climate power, Brazil has 
2 The notion that Brazil would be able to control deforestation because it was linked the path dependence of its economic development.
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never been a major power, since its emissions never have surpassed 5% of the global total 
(Climatewatch Data3). In terms of low carbon capital, whereas Brazil made some advances in 
hydroelectricity and biofuels, it never impacted the global market for low carbon technologies. 
Moreover, as the technological race accelerated in the 2010s – particularly on solar, wind and 
batteries – Brazil lagged behind. In terms of leadership in climate negotiations, Brazil was a 
climate leader during most of the first period (1989 - 2005), but an extremely conservative 
one, leading the developing world to avoid any kind of mitigation effort. During the second 
period (2006 - 2018), Brazilian influence in climate negotiations progressively diminished, 
as China and India became key players in the Convention. In the third period, Brazil seems to 
have abandoned any kind of leadership ambition. 
But the major problem with the Brazilian climate self-image has been on the climate 
commitment dimension, namely, the extreme irrationality of Brazilian emissions, which was 
systematically downplayed when not outright ignored by the government, international negotiators, 
and part of the epistemic community and NGOs, – both domestic and international. 
This extreme irrationality derived from the huge levels of deforestation in the Amazon, which 
accounted for between 34–80% of the country’s total emissions in the last three decades (SEEG 
Data). Per capita emissions in the Amazon region during the period 2000-2005 surpassed 60 tons 
– a higher level than that of global emission champions, such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, and Brunei. Moreover, even when Brazil was able to partially control deforestation 
from the mid-2000s, the levels were extremely high for a middle-income democracy. Finally, after 
almost a decade of decline, deforestation began to increase again in 2013.
The energy sector’s trajectory was also inconsistent with the image that Brazil displayed. 
Differently from almost every other major economy, the Brazilian energy and electricity matrix 
underwent a process of fossilization during the last decade (Figure 2). 


















2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Source: Own elaboration based on Brazil, Empresa de Pesquisa Energética 2018.
3 According to SEEG Data (http://plataforma.seeg.eco.br/total_emission), however, Brazilian emissions accounted for around 9% of global 
total in 2004.
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Brazil maintained the myth of a clean energy country not only when its major low carbon 
assets – hydroelectricity and ethanol – were retracting, but also when major resources were directed to 
develop the oil industry after the discovery of the pre-salt reservoirs, through the mega-capitalization 
of Petrobras in 2010 and the massive subsidies to gasoline and diesel consumption between 
2007 and 2014 (Viola and Franchini 2018). Following this path, the financial and managerial 
re-construction of Petrobras since 2016 has occurred under a strategy of extracting as much 
oil and as quickly as possible, engaging the company in a global race to the bottom among oil 
corporations, before fossil fuel constraints advance worldwide. 
Moreover, it is possible to argue that even hydroelectric and ethanol developments in Brazil 
have been transformed into individual myths, because contrary to the official discourse, they were 
not designed to address environmental concerns, but rather basic considerations of energy security 
and traditional cost-benefit calculations (Viola and Franchini 2018). While the hydroelectricity 
discourse tends to downplay some environmental disasters such as the Balbina Dam, the ethanol 
discourse tends to ignore the high carbon intensity of the transportation subsector in Brazil and, 
more recently, the choice made by the global industry to invest in electric cars, instead of biofuels. 
In this sense, the revival of the Ethanol Diplomacy through the Biofutures Platform also seems 
out of touch with reality. Finally, the Brazilian climate self-image was a myth because the advances 
in climate policy experienced during the late 2000s proved to be limited and short-termed. After 
a period of climate activism – from 2008 to early 2010 –  mitigation policies in the country first 
stagnated and then declined (Franchini 2019). The core example of this process was the return 
of deforestation in the Amazon in 2013. 
The Brazilian climate myth has, however, been more intense in the second period than 
in the first one. Indeed, between 1989 and 2005 Brazil accounted for a higher share of global 
emissions (Climatewatch Data) and was actually a major player in the UNFCCC process, 
leading most of the developing nations to conservative positions regarding mitigation, including 
China and India. In terms of climate commitment, although Brazil was a climate villain because 
of the extreme emissions coming from the Amazon deforestation, it never presented itself 
as a global role model in terms of mitigation, as it did in the second period. The narrative 
implied that Brazil was exempt from mitigation efforts, based on the interpretation of the 
CBDR principle. 
The distance between discourse and reality grew exponentially in the second period 
(2006 - 2018). Brazil continued to present itself as a major power, even when its share of 
global emissions was declining – because of its own successes in deforestation control as well 
as the souring emissions in China and India – and the low carbon capital of the country was 
diminishing – particularly because Brazil largely missed the non-traditional renewables revolution. 
Moreover, this was a period of decline of Brazil’s traditional low carbon assets – ethanol and 
hydroelectricity – and rise of the oil industry. Although Brazil continued to be influential in 
the UNFCCC, it did lose centrality, first having to share the stage with other big emerging 
economies through BASIC, and then witnessing the rise of China as the main non-Annex 1 
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negotiating party (Dong 2017). Accordingly, if Brazil left a strong mark on the KP process, its 
footprint in the post-Copenhagen period was lighter.
In terms of climate commitment, the actual – but limited – successes of Brazil during this 
period were exaggerated beyond recognition by the official discourse. Accordingly, the self-image 
of Brazil being a low carbon economy ignored not only the above–the–world average per capita 
emissions and elevated carbon intensity of GDP (Climatewatch Data), but the high levels of 
emissions coming from deforestation in the Amazon and Cerrado biomes, the fossilization of the 
energy and electricity matrix, the ethanol decline, the incentives to individual transportation and 
gasoline and diesel consumption, the stimulus given to the oil industry (also paired with crony 
capitalism practices as revealed by the Lava-Jato investigation), the stagnation and retraction of 
the National Policy on Climate Change, and the deployment of an economic policy oriented 
towards fostering economic growth at all costs (Viola and Franchini 2018).
In spite of this overwhelming evidence, the core of the Brazilian climate myth was maintained 
even during the Michel Temer administration, although it abandoned the delusional narrative of 
a low carbon economy. The deepening of the deforestation process in the Amazon, the alliance 
between the Temer government and the agribusiness sector, and more broadly, the deep degradation 
of Brazilian public institutions on account of the corruption schemes have further debunked 
the Brazilian myth. Finally, the Bolsonaro government opted to abandon the myth of the great 
reformist power and adopted a narrative of disregard for the governance of climate change and 
Brazil’s role in it.
Conclusion
Countries have their own self-image of the role they play in the global governance of climate 
change, both in terms of agency and commitment. If that self-image does not correspond to the 
country’s real level of climate power, commitment, and leadership, it becomes a myth. In this article 
we have defined, firstly, what climate self-images and myths are. Secondly, we have introduced a 
way of assessing whether a self-image is a myth or not, based on the operational concepts of climate 
power, commitment, and leadership. Finally, we have evaluated in detail the Brazilian climate 
self-image between 1989 and 2019, concluding that in almost the entire period, the Brazilian 
authorities deployed a climate myth, a distorted self-image that exaggerated the characteristics 
of the country within its three dimensions: power, commitment, and leadership. Consequently, 
Brazil presented itself as a great reformist climate power committed to the stabilization of the 
climate system through domestic action and foreign policy, always defending the interests of the 
developing world through the lens of the CBDR principle. 
Myths and self-images change both in terms of substance and intensity. Consequently, we 
have identified three periods in the Brazilian climate myth. In the first (1989 - 2005), Brazilian 
authorities displayed the image of a moderate great power and leader of the developing world, 
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trying to counter the international narrative of Brazil as a climate villain. Irrational emissions 
from Amazon deforestation limited the possibility of Brazil presenting itself as a reformist actor 
in terms of mitigation, although the country still claimed to be doing its fair share based on 
economic development considerations.
In the second period (2006 - 2018), the myth was unleashed, and Brazil presented 
itself as a great reformist power, a global model for climate change mitigation capable of 
strongly influencing the path of the UNFCCC negotiations. Controlling deforestation in the 
Amazon and President Lula’s leadership were central to this development, which was strongly 
associated with the myth of Brazil as an emerging power in the international system, capable 
of shaping global policy. In this period, important national actors supported the Brazilian 
climate myth – politicians, senior officials, corporations, NGOs, media and even a sector of 
the scientific community. Also, relevant international actors supported the Brazilian myth, 
either by sharing a radical interpretation of the CBDR principle with the country – such as 
China, India, Indonesia, South Africa – or because Brazil seemed less reluctant than other 
large emerging countries to assume mitigation commitments – such as the European Union 
and the United States under Obama. 
In assessing the Brazilian self-image in both periods, we concluded that they were myths, due 
to the distance between the discourse and Brazil’s actual levels of power, commitment, and climate 
leadership. In the first period, Brazil’s self-image was a myth due to the extreme irrationality of 
Amazon deforestation, the exaggeration of the country’s capabilities to alter the global climate 
social outcome and the conservative position of the country in the UNFCCC negotiations, which 
led the developing world to a radical interpretation of the CBDR principle. Brazil was not a 
cooperative developing country doing its fair share of the effort, although it played a leading role 
in UNFCCC negotiations in most of the period. 
In the second period, the myth was more intense, as Brazil continued a major power 
narrative as its levels of climate power were declining and its role in the UNFCCC negotiations 
was being overshadowed by other non-Annex 1 countries, particularly China. However, the 
key aspect of the mythical characteristic of the Brazilian climate self-image was on the climate 
commitment side. Consequently, the Brazilian discourse deliberately ignored that the success 
of controlling deforestation was based on the previous irrational trajectory of LULUCF 
emissions and that it only lasted until 2012; that the energy matrix was fossilizing; that huge 
amounts of resources were being channeled towards the expansion of the oil industry, also to 
fuel corruption schemes; and that economic policy was aimed at fostering economic growth 
at all costs.  
The third period (2019 - ?) is somewhat different, as the climate myth has been almost 
abandoned. In fact, after the major changes in Brazilian domestic politics since 2013, the 
climate self-image of a major reformist power with global leadership has been discarded by the 
Bolsonaro government, which has described the climate agenda itself as a myth and a threat to 
the country’s sovereignty, returning to a kind of Amazon paranoia. However, even if the myth has 
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been dramatically undermined, the potential for reactivation does exist, should another political 
coalition win the general elections of 2022, given how large and widespread the obsession with 
international status in Brazilian society is.
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